Why has India never signed the NPT?

India is one of a handful of countries outside the NPT, and it has stayed out under every government since 1968. That is not because India rejects the idea of stopping the spread of nuclear weapons. It is because of what the treaty's text does with a date.

Everything below comes from the treaty's text, UN resolutions, IAEA and Nuclear Suppliers Group documents, and statements by India's government. Where a question is still argued, the essay sets out each side and leaves the verdict to you.

What does the NPT say?

The NPT is a bargain between two groups of states. Nuclear-weapon states promise not to help anyone else get the weapons (Article I). Every other party, a non-nuclear-weapon state, promises not to make or receive them (Article II), and to accept safeguards: inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to check that its nuclear material stays in civilian use (Article III). All parties keep the right to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes (Article IV). And each of them undertakes, in Article VI:

“to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.” (Article VI)

Notice what Article VI promises: negotiations, in good faith. It sets no date by which the five must give up their weapons. That gap is at the centre of India's objection.

Why does 1 January 1967 matter?

Because the treaty decides who is a nuclear-weapon state by a date, not by what a country has. Article IX(3) reads:

“For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January, 1967.” (Article IX(3))

Five countries had: the United States, the Soviet Union (now Russia), the United Kingdom, France and China, whose first test was on 16 October 1964. India's first test, at Pokhran on 18 May 1974, came seven years after the cutoff. Under the treaty, India can therefore only ever be a non-nuclear-weapon state. The UN Security Council said so in resolution 1172 of 6 June 1998: under the NPT, India and Pakistan “cannot have the status of a nuclear-weapon State”.

Could the date be changed? Only by amending the treaty, and Article VIII(2) requires an amendment to win a majority of all the parties, “including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty” and of the parties on the IAEA's Board of Governors. Any one of the five can block a change to who counts as one of the five.

What does India object to?

India's stated objection is that the treaty is discriminatory: it divides the world into five states that may keep nuclear weapons and everyone else, and asks the five only to negotiate. Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran put it in a lecture on non-proliferation: India “chose not to be a party to the NPT, precisely because of its inherently discriminatory nature.” In 2004, when a draft at the UN General Assembly's First Committee called on India to join as a non-nuclear-weapon state, India voted against it and called that demand “unrealistic and unacceptable”.

There is a yardstick older than the treaty. While it was being negotiated, the UN General Assembly, in resolution 2028 (XX) of 19 November 1965, set out that it should embody “an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers”. Measured against that, the objection runs, the balance was not struck: non-nuclear-weapon states accept binding limits and inspections now, while nuclear-weapon states accept a duty to negotiate, with no date.

What changed in 1974 and 1998?

India tested twice, and each time the costs of staying out rose. On 18 May 1974 India exploded a device at Pokhran and called it a peaceful nuclear explosion, one meant for civil uses. Suppliers of nuclear technology answered by forming what became the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), which first met in London in 1975. Its own account of why it exists begins with “the explosion in 1974 of a nuclear device by a non-nuclear-weapon State”.

On 11 and 13 May 1998 India carried out five underground tests and declared itself a nuclear-weapon state. Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee later recalled: “I had declared at that time that India is now a nuclear weapon state and that we would follow a ‘no first use’ policy.” Pakistan tested on 28 and 30 May. Resolution 1172 then urged India and Pakistan to join the NPT and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty “without delay and without conditions”.

How did India get nuclear trade without signing?

By a separate route built for India alone, in three steps between 2005 and 2008.

1. 18 July 2005. In a joint statement with the United States, India undertook to identify and separate its civilian and military nuclear facilities in phases, declare the civilian ones to the IAEA, and place them voluntarily under safeguards. India's separation plan was presented to Parliament on 11 May 2006.
2. 1 August 2008. The IAEA's Board of Governors approved, by consensus, a safeguards agreement for India's civilian nuclear facilities. India signed it on 2 February 2009, and it came into force on 11 May 2009.
3. 5 and 6 September 2008. External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee restated India's commitment to a “voluntary, unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing” and to no first use. On 6 September the NSG adopted a statement that lets its members supply India with nuclear items and technology for peaceful use in civilian facilities under IAEA safeguards.

The result is unusual. India is outside the treaty and keeps its weapons, yet it can trade for its civilian programme, which IAEA inspectors check. Its military facilities are not under safeguards.

Could India join now?

Only by giving up its weapons. The treaty has no third category, so a new party joins as a non-nuclear-weapon state. South Africa is the country that has done it. It had built six nuclear weapons and dismantled them, acceded to the NPT on 10 July 1991, announced the programme in March 1993, and let IAEA inspectors verify that it had ended.

India has not said it will. Its 1998 declaration, its 2004 vote and the 2008 arrangement all rest on India keeping its weapons outside the treaty.

The positions on each side

Both readings accept the same text. They disagree on what it is for: holding the line at five, or getting to none. A good answer shows the examiner it knows the articles each side is reading from.